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ABSTRACT 
This article explores the differences, similarities, comparative advantages and 
disadvantages between developer funding requirements for Affordable and Work 
Force Housing in the United States and Spain. Emphasis is placed on impact fees 
as a revenue source in the United States and value recapture requirements in 
Spain and in Catalonia in particular. The author concludes that American impact 
fees provide a broader base for developer funding requirement but that Spanish 
land value recapture programs offer greater flexibi lity to planning officials when 
they are applicable. 
Key words: Affordable housing;Work Force Housing; Impact Fees;Land Value 
Recapture;Developer Infrastructure Funding Requirements 
I. An Introduction to the Funding of Affordable and Work Force 
Housing in the USA and Spain 
1 Professor and Ben F. Johnson, Jr. Chair in Law, Director of the Center for the Comparative 
Study of Metropolitan Growth, Georgia State University; A.B. & J.D .. Duke University. 
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The need for affordable housing in all countries is not in doubt2 and data 
as well as personal observation strongly supports that need in the United States 
and Spain. The need is not debated. 3 The debate in both countries is how 
affordable housing can and should be financed. The purpose of this article is to 
focus on potential funding of affordable housing through financial obligations 
placed on developers in the development approval process of the two countries. 
Although such programs often are and frequently need to be combined with 
public financing of various types, an examination of such programs is left to the 
works of other authors included in this collection. 
II. An American View 
A. Developer Funding Programs in General 
How can developers be required to provide or finance affordable 
housing? Developer funding or provision of infrastructure as a condition which 
must be met in order to obtain development permission has a long history in the 
United States stretching back nearly a century and first appeared in the fom1 of 
required dedications for plat approval in subdivision regulation law.4 Required 
dedications are still used in affordable housing programs in the form of set asides 
and inclusionary requirements - or inclusionary zoning, as it is often labeled.5 
For example, a commonly encountered approach to developer funding of 
affordable housing is to require a residential developer, for example, to set aside 
land within his development for the construction of affordable units and even to 
include construction of such units on site and sell' or rent them at below free 
market value. 
Required dedications which first related only to infrastructure within 
subdivisions have evolved into impact fees or development fees as they are 
labeled in some jurisdictions. In one form or another, impact fees now exist in 
2 Juli Ponce, "Affordable Housing and Social Mix: Comparative Approach, vol.2 , #1 Journal of 
Legal Affairs and Dispute Resolution in Engineering and Construction 31 (Feb. I, 20 I 0). 
3 Several of the articles published as part of this Study Space publication explore these issues in 
detail and the reader is referred to them. 
4 Juergensmeyer & Roberts, LAND USE PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT REGULATION 
LAW 436 (3d ed. 2012). 
5 Juergensmeyer & Roberts, LAND USE PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT REGULATION 
LAW 381 (3d ed. 2012). For a comparison of the Spanish approach with American inclusionary 
zoning, see Juli Ponce, "Affordable Housing and Social Mix: Comparative Approach, vol.2, #1 
Journal of Legal Affairs and Dispute Resolution in Engineering and Constniction 31, 37 (Feb. 1, 
2010). 
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nearly all states and are a common technique used to generate revenue for capital 
funding necessitated by new development. To date, approximately 27 states 
have enacted impact fee enabling legislation6 and in most other states impact fees 
are enacted pursuant to home rule powers or pursuant to individual local 
government enablement. Impact fees are charges levied by local governments on 
new developments in order to pay a proportionate share of the capital costs of 
providing public infrastructure to those developments. In the Georgia 
Development Impact Fee Act, a leading impact fee enabling statute, an "impact 
fee" is defined as "a payment of money imposed upon development as a 
condition of development approval to pay for a proportionate share of the cost of 
system improvements needed to serve new growth and development."7 Impact 
fees play an increasingly important role in the efforts of local governments to 
cope with the economic burdens of population growth such as the need for new 
parks, roads, schools, jails, public buildings, libraries, sewer, water treatment and 
stonn water facilities, and public safety buildings and equipment.8 
The essential legal principle that governs the validity of impact fees is 
the rational nexus test. Since impact fees are enacted pursuant to a governmental 
unit's land use control power it is police power based and consequently must 
satisfy a reasonableness test. This test for the validity of impact fees is usually 
expressed as the dual rational nexus test. Simply stated, the rational nexus test, 
i.e., the dual rational nexus test, has two components: (I) Impact fees may be no 
more than the government's infrastructure costs which are reasonably 
attributable to the new development, i.e. that development's proportionate share, 
and (2) The new development required to pay impact fees must benefit from the 
expenditure of those fees.9 
Considerable attention has been given in many American jurisdictions to 
giving modest subsidies to affordable housing by providing certain exemptions 
or special treatment from impact fees for infrastructure items such as roads, 
parks, and public building for affordable housing projects. 10 Being exempted 
6 See Arthur C. Nelson, James C. Nicholas & Julian C. Juergensmeyer, Impact Fees: Principles 
and Practice of Proportionate Share Development Fees Ch. 4 (2009). 
7 Georgia Development Impact Fee Act, Ga. Code Ann. § 36-71-2(8). System improvements, 
also called non-site related improvements, are to be distinguished from project improvements, 
also called site related improvements. 
s Juergensmeyer & Roberts, LAND USE PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT REGULATION 
LAW 532 (3d ed. 2012). 
9 Id at 549. 
10 Nelson, Bowles, Juergensmeyer & Nicholas, A GUIDE TO IMPACT FEES AND HOUSING 
AFFORDABILITY (2008). 
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from all or a portion of the impact fees that the affordable housing project would 
otherwise have to pay decreases their construction cost. Such subsidies are 
generally rather minor and therefore the more important question is whether 
there can be impact fee programs designed to fund affordable housing. Without 
doubt, impact fees are a possible funding source for the construction of 
affordable housing even though the vast majority of impact fee programs found 
in the United States at the present time focus on so-called "hard infrastructure" 
for example, roads, parks, schools, public buildings, libraries, and public safety 
facilities. The seminal case in this regard is I-Iolmdel Builders Ass 'n v. Township 
of Holmdel, in which the New Jersey Supreme Court upheld the imposition of 
fees on commercial and non-inclusionary residential developments for the 
construction of low income housing. 11 The court examined two substantive 
issues l.) If there was statutory authority under the municipality's police power 
to impose affordable housing development fees as a condition for development 
approval and 2.) If affordable housing development fees are an unconstitutional 
form of taxation. 
The Holmdel Township ordinance imposed a mandatory development 
fee on all new commercial and residential development as a condition for 
receiving a certificate of occupancy with the funds collected dedicated to an 
affordable housing trust fund. In exchange, the development received a density 
bonus. 12 The ordinance linked community-housing goals with real estate 
development to address the lower income-housing crisis. Linkage strategies 
relate the housing and infrastructure needs created by new development to a 
requirement that the entity generating the need provide· the resources to pay for 
the impacts of the development. The Court found that providing lower income 
housing is one of the purposes of police power eligible zoning authority 
incorporated by reference into New Jersey's Zoning and Enabling Act. 13 The 
"real and substantial" relationship between development fee measures affects 
" the nature and extent of the uses of land and buildings and structures thereon" 
and is not an impennissible exaction. In overturning the Appellate Division's 
opinion, the Court found that affordable housing development fee ordinances 
must bear a reasonable relationship, not a "stringent nexus", between commercial 
construction and the need for affordable housing; ultimately concluding that the 
dual rational nexus test is too stringent to be appropriate in determining the 
relationship between development fees and affordable housing. 
II 121 N.J. 550, 583 2d 277 (1990). 
12 121 N.J. 550, 559 (1990). 
13 121 N.J. 550, 567 (1990). 
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In regard to constitutionality, New Jersey's Fair Housing Act (FHA) 
does not expressly authorize a municipality to impose development fees. The 
statute's language does confer broad powers on a municipality - including 
authority "to provide for its share of low and moderate income housing by means 
of any technique or combination of techniques which provide a realistic 
oppo1tunity for the provision of its fair share". In interpreting the FHA's 
language, the Court deemed authority to require development fees to be 
supported by the FHA while leaving open the question if development fees must 
always be compensated with density bonuses. 14 The decision lends authority to 
the proposition that affordable housing development fee ordinances are 
permissible land use regulations and not excessive and unconstitutional exactions 
but the Court's indication that a less strict standard of review than the dual 
rational nexus test applies is not necessarily a position that should be expected 
from courts in other jurisdictions. 
The California Supreme Court recently held in Sterling Park, L.P. v. 
City of Palo Alto that an affordable housing requirement of ten out of 96 
residential units and a payment of a fee of approximately 5% of the sales value of 
the market rate units both constituted exactions rather than land use regulations.15 
Without deciding if the imposed requirements were constitutional, the decision 
placed future affordable housing requirements under a higher scrutiny by 
requiring municipalities to demonstrate a nexus and rough proportionality 
between the affordable housing requirement and the impact it is intended to 
address. 16 The California Supreme Court has granted review to address the 
applicable standard for affordable housing requirements in California Building 
lndust1y Ass'n v. City of San Jose. 17 The City of San Jose adopted an affordable 
housing ordinance requiring a fraction of all new development to be dedicated to 
low to moderate income housing. 18 The California Building Industry 
Association challenged the decision, arguing the city fai led to show a 
"reasonable relationship" between the requirements and a public need for 
affordable housing. 19 In upholding the ordinance, the Appellate Court found the 
ordinance to be a land use regulation rather than an exaction and thus reviewable 
14 121N.J. 550, 575 (1990). 
15Sterling Park, L.P. v. City of Palo Allo, 57 Cal. 4th 1193, 1207 (20 13). 
16 Id. at 1205 
17 California Bldg. Indus. Ass'n v. City of San Jose, 157 Cal. Rptr. 3d 813, 815 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2013) review granted and opinion superseded sub nom. California Bldg. Indus. Assn. v. City of 
San Jose, 307 P.3d 878 (Cal. 2013) 
18 Id. at 816. 
19 Id. at 817 
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as an exercise of police power rather than the strict scrutiny applicable to 
exactions. 20 
Even though the Holmdel program and the California programs just 
discussed focused on funding the construction of "affordable housing," there 
may be advantages under American law to make a distinction between affordable 
housing and work force housing. 
B. Workforce Housing vs. Affordable Housing 
Despite frequently being used interchangeably, affordable housing and 
workforce housing have different meanings. Fundamentally, workforce housing 
is a subset of affordable housing that ties moderately priced housing to a 
community's middle and lower middle income working citizens. Politically, due 
to its association with middle rather than low income households, workforce 
housing is a more palatable fonn of affordable housing in high income 
communities where low income housing is associated with socioeconomic class 
bias. Legally, inclusionary zoning encompasses workforce housing, with many 
municipal ordinances requiring linkage fees to spur workforce housing 
?I development.-
Affordable housing fees are often referred to as "linkage fees" on the 
theory that because of their social importance they should be entitled to less 
stringent scrutiny from courts. As discussed above, the Holmdel 22court took this 
position. In most jurisdictions, however, they are considered a form of exaction 
and thus subject to the "essential nexus" takings test·of Nol/an.23 Where there is 
no evidence of a nexus between the development and the problem an exaction 
seeks to address, the exaction may not be upheld.24 In finding a constitutional 
20 Id. at 824. See also Home Builders Ass'n of Northern California v. City of Napa, 90 Cal. App. 
4th 188, 108 Cal. Rptr. 2d 60, 31 Envtl. L. Rep. 20800, 22 A.LR.6th 785 (1st Dist. 2001), as 
modified, (July 2, 2001), cert. denied 122 S. Ct. 1356 (2002) (Nollan and Dolan held not 
applicable to inclusionary zoning ordinance which was generally applicable to all development 
in the city.). 
21 Matthew J. Parlow, Whither Workforce Housing?, 40 Fordham Urb. L.J. 1645, 1659 (2013). 
It is interesting to note that in France there can be made a distinction between work force 
housing and affordable housing, because since 1943 there is a mechanism for funding housing 
for the work force paid by companies called "participation des employeurs a l'effort de 
construction" also known as "1% logement". Further information can be obtained at 
http://fr. \\i kipedia.oru/wikiiParticipation des ernploveurs a l'effort de construction. 
22 121N.J.550, 583 2d 277 (1990). 
23 Commercial Builders of N. California v. City of Sacramento, 941 F.2d 872, 875 (9th Cir. 
1991) 
24 Id. 
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essential nexus existed, the Ninth Circuit Commercial Builders court examined a 
study produced by the city connecting the exactions required of the developer 
with the need for low income housing and the effect of nonresidential 
development on the demand for such housing."5 
While courts have disagreed over applying strict scrutiny to workforce 
housing ordinances, they have consistently required a reasonable relationship 
between the fee assessed and the housing need generated directly by the 
development.26 Thorough and detailed studies of workforce jobs required and 
generated by the proposed commercial development, calculating precise fees, 
and exchanging density bonus or other benefits offer a direct route to establishing 
an essential nexus.27 
The major legal hurdle confronted in the defense of an affordable 
housing impact fee is of course satisfying the dual rational nexus test - i.e. 
establishing that the proposed development will create a need for and be 
benefitted by affordable housing. Since not all courts will be willing to relax the 
dual rational nexus test as did the New Jersey Supreme court, it would seem that 
concentrating on work force housing will be more likely to pass judicial scrutiny. 
An innovative developer fund ing based workforce housing program proposed for 
but not yet adopted by a Florida local government will be used as a model for 
discussion purposes. The dilemma faced by the City of Destin, Florida, a 
prosperous and popular resort community is that housing costs have exceeded the 
ability of the local workforce - construction workers, service personnel, public 
school teachers, firemen, police men and paramedics to afford and therefore is 
preventing them from living in the community. The Report prepared by Professor 
James C. Nicholas, City of Destin Attainable Workforce Housing Study 28 
explains this dilemma: 
"Housing prices in Destin have risen to the point that there are concerns about 
the ability of a substantial portion of the workforce to find adequate housing. 
Although prices have abated, they are still matters of concern. Such an inability 
could have serious implications for the Destin economy and for Destin's society. 
The median price of the existing home in Destin now stands at $4 15,000, 75% 
25 Id. at 873. 
26 David L. Callies, Mandatory Set-Asides as Land Development Conditions, 42/43 Urb. Law. 
307, 316 (20 11) 
27 Id. at 329. 
28 City of Destin, Attainable Workforce Housing Study: Prepared for the City of Destin By 
James C. Nicholas, Ph.D., August 2007. 
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higher than the statewide average of $237,800 and 86% higher than the national 
average of $223,000." 
'The continuing development of Destin is a major factor leading to the increased 
prices of Destin homes. Each new building adds to the need for construction 
workers and then, after construction, to the need for employees that will operate 
and maintain those structures. Many of the employees needed to serve Destin's 
economic growth will not be able to afford adequate housing within Destin. 
Labor shortages that may result will lessen the economic attractiveness of Destin 
as a place for business location or expansion. 
The construction and operation of residential and non-residential developments 
will demand additional employees and those employees, in turn, will require 
housing. The first impact is the actual construction of buildings. Destin 
construction workers earn $33,073 and their households have $45,739, given 
more than one wage-earner per household. A household with this income can 
afford to pay $144,832 for housing. This income does not provide sufficient 
resources for constrnction workforce households in Destin to afford market 
housing in or around Destin. 
Once residences are built they must be operated and maintained, thus creating the 
need for continuing employees and their housing. The typical residential 
operational and maintenance employee earns $39,271, with the household 
income of that employee being $51,93 7. These employees can afford to pay 
$164,457 for housing and thus will need housing assistance in order to afford 
adequate workforce housing in Destin, which is priced at $165,873 for these 
employees. Therefore the data show that the construction, operation and 
maintenance of residential structures do result in net unmet workforce housing 
needs." 
The report proceeds to establish a formulae for the workforce housing 
needs created by commercial and residential development so as to assign the 
workforce housing obligation which needs to be fulfilled as a prerequisite for the 
granting of development permission. The fonnula takes into account the 
difference in workforce demand created by residential units designed to be 
occupied full time from those intended to be occupied part time (vacation 
homes). For example the Report provides: 
"Once a residence has been constructed it must be operated and 
maintained. Some people do much of the operational and maintenance activities 
themselves. while others do not. The residential survey conducted by RRC, 
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Associates, Incorporated, found that the average number of full time equivalent 
employees (FTE) per residential unit in Destin was 0.0854. With an estimated 
86,539 dwelling units for Okaloosa County in 2006, total operational and 
maintenance employment would be 7,390. This is l 77 person-hours per 
residence per year devoted to operations and maintenance by employed persons." 
The Ordinance imposes an obligation on developers to provide 
"affordable workforce housing units" which are defined as "a dwelling unit 
which is provided for a person employed in the City of Destin and their families, 
either through sale or rent, at prices that are restricted to ensure the unit is 
maintained as affordable to persons employed in the City." The draft ordinance29 
innovatively gives the developer several choices in regard to fulfillment of the 
workforce housing obligation. 
The choices, subject to approval by the City in a Workforce Housing 
Mitigation Plan entered into by it and the developer are as follow: 
1. To build the requisite number of workforce housing tmits on site or off site. If 
the developer choses this option then the units must be deed restricted when 
sold so as to maintain their character as affordable units. 
2. Developer can convert the requisite number of free market housing units to 
workforce/affordable units. As with the case of the construction of workforce 
units restrictions are imposed designed to "keep' the units affordable. 
3. Developer can contract with nonprofit organizations (a good example would 
be the Habitat for Humanity) to provide · the workforce units on the 
developer's behalf and 
4. The developer can pay an in lieu fee (similar to an impact fee) into the City's 
Affordable Workforce Housing Trust Account. The amount of the fee would 
be detenn ined as the cost of building the requisite number of workforce units 
and the money paid to the City must be spent for the construction or 
conversion of affordable housing units. 
5. The developer, with the City's approval may convey land to the City which it 
can use as the site for construction for workforce housing or sell and transfer 
the proceeds to the Trust Account. 
The developer, with the City's permission may also combine two or 
more of these methods. The purpose of providing for so many options is not only 
29 City of Destin Florida, Draft Ordinance on Affordable Workforce Housing Mitigation (2007). 
The author of this article was a consultant to the City in regard to the preparation of the report 
and the drafting of the Ordinance. 
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to give considerable flexibility to the developer but to enhance the potential 
judicial view of the reasonableness of the Program. 
III. Land Value capture as a source of funding for affordable housing in 
Spain 
An important source of revenue for affordable housing in many Spanish 
regions is land value capture: 
"Value capture refers to the recovery by the public of the land value increments 
(unearned income ... ) generated by the actions other than the landowner's direct 
investments ... . Although all such increments are essentially unearned income, 
value capture policies focus primarily on the increment generated by public 
investments and administrative actions, such as granting pennission for the 
development of specific land uses and densities. The objective is to draw on 
publicly generated land value increments to enable local administrations to 
improve the performance of land use management and to fund urban 
infrastructure and service provisions. The notion is that benefits provided by 
governments to private landowners should be shared fa irly among all 
residents. "30 
The use of land value capture in Spain in general and in Catalonia in 
particular is complicated and a detailed discussion of it is definitely beyond the 
possible scope of this article. It is examined in detail in the inclusionary housing 
context in a book chapter written by Professor Nrco Calavita and others. 31 
Before giving an overview of the use of land value recapture to finance 
affordable housing, Calavita emphasizes the need to consider the somewhat 
30 Martim Smolka, Implementing Value Capture in Latin America: Policies and Tools for Urban 
Development 8 (Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, 2013). 
" In Spain, municipalities capnue part of the value increase in urban extension areas by requiring 
landowners to cede between 5 and 15 percent of the serviced building plots to the municipality. 
In addition, lando~ners must provide the land needed for infrastructure, pay the related costs for 
service provision, and pay the overhead costs and a profit margin." Smolka 14. 
31 Calavita, Clusa, Mur & Wiener, Spain's Constitutional Mandates: The Right to Housing, 
Land Value Recapture, and Inclusionary Housing, Chapter 7 in Calavita & Mallach, 
INCLUSIONAR Y HOUSING IN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE: AFFORDABLE 
HOUSfNG, SOCLAL INCLUSION • AND LAND VALUE RECAPTURE (Lincoln Institute of 
Land Policy, 2010).( The Book Chapter is hereinafter cited as CALA VITA.] Similar issues and 
examples of inclusionary housing issues in Catalonia are explored in Janice Griffith, 
BARCELONA, SPAIN AS A MODEL FOR THE CREATION OF INNOVATION 
DISTRICTS AND SUSTAINABLE SOCIAL HOUSING WITHOUT SPATIAL 
SEGREGATION at page_ in the present collection of Barcelona Sn1dy Space papers. 
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unique Spanish statutory and constitutional context in which the program occurs, 
starting with Spain's 1956 Planning Act. 
"Departing from a tradition in which property rights were sacrosanct and 
local government paid for all infrastructure costs, a drastic new approach was 
devised, founded on four main principles. 
l. Social .function of property. The right to land ownership and 
development is accompanied by obligations and duties. 
2. Distributive equity. The increases in land values resulting from plan 
designations for development are to be shared equally among property owners. 
3. Discretionmy power of lmv. Urban planning is a public function 
expressed through the municipal (or, rarely, multijurisdictional) general plan, 
which distinguishes three juridical categories of property; urbanized, urbanizing, 
and nondevelopable, each with its own rights and duties. 
4. Juridical security of administrative acts. Arbitrary acts by the public 
sector are limited, and future land values are ensured through the systematic 
assignation of uses, values, rights, and duties. In exchange, property owners are 
responsible for the urban infrastructure and public facilities."32 
Refonns in I 975 required land owners to provide the public facilities 
needed per the comprehensive plan for new developments, including parkland. 
'The 1975 legislation also required a donation to the municipality of 
land equivalent in value to I 0 percent of the profit from the development. This 
requirement was increased to 15 percent in 1990, butreflecting the shift from a 
socialist to a conservative government, returned to I 0 percent in 1996. The 
donation can be seen as a betterment tax on the benefits of urban development."33 
In regard to current Spanish constitutional provisions relevant to the use 
of land value caprure and related techniques as the source of funding for 
affordable housing, the two most important are Sections 33 and 47. The former 
which adopts the social function theory of ownership which subjects land owners 
to responsibilities as well as rights and subjects land ownership to obligations to 
serve a social and not j ust a private role. 
32 Calavita 241. For brief description of the Spanish land use law framework, see CNC: 
Comision Nacional de la Competencia, "Competition Problems in the Spanish Land Market: 
Discussion Paper," (30 July 20 13). 
33 Calavita 242. 
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"Section 33 I. The right to private property and inheritance is 
recognized. 2. The social function of these rights shall determine the limits of 
their content in accordance with the law. 3. No one may be deprived of his or her 
property and rights, except on justified grounds of public utility or social interest 
and with a proper compensation in accordance with the law." 
The second is Section 4 7 
"Section 47. All Spaniards have the right to enjoy decent and adequate 
housing. The public authorities shall promote the necessary conditions and 
establish appropriate standards in order to make this right effective, regulating 
land use in accordance with the general interest in order to prevent speculation. 
The community shall have a share in the benefits accruing from the town-
planning policies of public bodies." 
Although the relevant laws have undergone changes in recent years and 
differ in the different autonomous regions of Spain,34 the process by which land 
value capture provides land or funds for affordable housing can be summarized 
as follows. 35 The burdens placed on the landowners are compensation to the 
public for the (private) benefits they realize after doing an urban transfom1ation 
operations, such as the ability to build and sell houses, etc. So, the Public 
Administration allows a land transfonnation that increases the wealth of the land 
owner through the Planning Gain, 36 "aprovechamiento urbanistico", which 
obligates the land owner to give something back to the public interest. 
That obligation includes: 
1.- Obligation for the land owner to deliver for free to the Public 
Administration the land for urban endowments/public utilities, and 
2.- Obligation for the land owner to assign for free a percentage of 
the Planning Gain to the Public Administration.37 
34 The minimum parameters are set by the State (currently by the Royal Legislative Decree 
2/2008 of20 June, approving the Land Act). 
35 The author is deeply indebted to Rafael Fernandez Bautista for the explanation that follows. 
Any inaccuracies must be attributed to me. 
36PJanning Gain, is calculated based on the Floor Area Ratio, uses and intensity of uses allowed 
on the land. Planning Gain capture applies to different kind of uses (commercial, industrial, 
residential). 
37 The State (within the above mentioned Royal Legislative Decree 2/2008 of20 June, 
approving the Land Act), establishes that the assignation of the Pla1111ing Gain that each 
Autonomous Conununity has to obligate (through its specific legislation) to the land owner, to 
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In the case of Catalonia, the Legislative Decree 1/20 I 0 of 3 August, of 
Urbanism, states that Urban-land-owners of not fully developed land have to 
deliver for free I 0% of the Planning Gain and the owners of developable land 
have to deliver for free a percentage that soars to 15%. Finally, this Planning 
Gain can be delivered (i) in kind (plot of land suitable to fit the percentage given) 
or, in some cases (but it is restrictive), (ii) in cash (amount equivalent to the 
value of the land that would be given). 
The Public Administration destines the land based on this percentage of 
the Planning Gain given (or its monetization) to the Public Land and Housing 
Heritage. The purposes of the Public Land and Housing Heritage are according 
to Section 160.5 of the Legislative Decree 1/2010 of3 August, of Urbanism of 
Catalonia: (a) to anticipate expanding populations and improving their quality of 
life. (b) to create affordable housing, (c) to intervene in the housing market to 
lower prices, and (d) to create reserves of tmdeveloped land. 
IV. Comparison and E"aluation of American and Spanish Approaches 
At first blush it would appear that American impact fees and Spanish 
value recapture programs proceed from very different approaches to developer 
funding requirements. Impact fees are based on the theory that new development 
and not existing residents should bear the cost of providing new infrastructure. 
The Spanish land value capture approach addresses the much discussed but 
seldom implemented, in the US, idea of using windfalls38 landowners receive 
from obtaining development pennission to mitigate the wipeouts suffered by 
landowners negatively affected by new development or the denial of 
development pennission or negative consequences suffered by society in general. 
There has been much emphasis in the U.S in recent years on programs designed 
to compensate landowners negatively affected by land use controls but virtually 
no attention has been paid to the question of capturing for the public any portion 
of the gains conferred on landowners by virtue of public improvements and 
government regulations. Those few who have considered the equity - or lack 
thereof - involved in granting windfalls but not compensating for wipeouts often 
cite the writings of Henry George's classic work Progress and Poverty and the 
late 20°' century publications of one of America 's best known land use control 
give for free to the Public Administration, has to be between 5% and 15% like a general rule 
(sometimes it is possible to reduce/increase this percentage). 
38 The American concept of windfalls bears close resemblance to the British concept of 
"betterment." See English Expert Committee on Compensation and Betterment (Uthwatt 
Committee), Final Report. Cmd. No. 6386 (1942). 
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law scholars, Donald Hagman. In 1978 Professor Hagman and Dean Misczynski 
published through the American Planning Association a collection of essays 
titled Windfalls for Wipeouts: Land Value Capture and Compensation. 39 
Professor Hagman was more concerned with using windfall recapture as a source 
of wipeout mitigation than he was with using value recapture to fund public 
projects but he nonetheless noted that under such a program the community is 
only asking for a return of a portion of the wealth it creates. 
It is interesting to note as a leading authority on Land Value Capture 
describes U.S. impact fees as a land value capture approach.40 So perhaps the 
Spanish and the U.S. approach are not that different in theory or result. 
However, whatever the philosophical relationship of the two, current American 
impact fee practice seems considerably more flexible. Although conceptually 
Spain could designate value recapture for purposes other than affordable 
housing, its current confinement to that purpose requires other ways of paying 
for roads, parks, schools, libraries, public buildings, public safety facilities, etc. 
Although in Spain the developer has to pay and deliver to the administration all 
the development works and the infrastructure that connect with the general 
services. Also collection of impact fees is not confined to major development 
projects since it is collected as a precondition for building permit issuance and 
can therefore be collected for the constrnction of a single dwelling or commercial 
unit as well as when there is redevelopment. Although the value capture 
approach is flexible in the sense that there ma·y be an arbitrary percentage of 
planning gain -- 5 %, 10%, etc., the impact fee must be precisely proportionate 
to the cost of providing infrastructure for new development and the money 
collected must be spent in a way to benefit those who pay the fees and not j ust to 
provide a general benefit to the public. Of course the serious negative to the 
American approach in the affordable housing context is that relatively few 
jurisdictions have thus far recognized that impact fees can be used to raise funds 
for affordable or work force housing. From that standpoint the Spanish value 
recapture approach and the certainty of its legality has a definitive edge. 
39 Hagman & Misczynski,Windfalls For Wipeows: Land Value Capture and Compe11satio11 
(1978). A summary of their principal points can be found at Juergensmeyer & Roberts,, LAND 
USE PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT REGULATION LAW 81-89 (3d ed. 2012). 
40 Martim Smolka, Implementing Value Capture in Latin America: Policies and Tools for Urban 
Development 14 (Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, 201 3). 
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